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Abstract—Keeping patients sensitive information secured and
untampered in the e-Health system is of paramount importance.
Emerging as a promising technology to build a secure and reliable
distributed ledger, blockchain can protect its data from being
falsified, which has attracted much attention from both academia
and industry. However, with limited computational resources,
medical IoT devices do not have enough ability to fulfill the
functionalities as a full node in wireless blockchain network
(WBN). Facing this dilemma, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC)
brings us dawn and hope through offloading the high resource
demanding blockchain functionalities at the IoT devices to the
MEC. However, aiming to maximize the mining profit, most of
existing offloading strategies have ignored that the actual need
of wireless devices is instant data writing, which is also the
problem faced by blockchain technology. In this paper, according
to different needs, blockchain nodes are firstly divided into
two categories. One is blockchain users whose needs are faster
transaction uploading, the other is blockchain miners whose goals
are maximum revenue. Then, to maximize both the utilities of
blockchain users and blockchain miners, a Stackelberg game is
introduced to formulate the interaction between them. From the
simulation results, this game is proved to converge to a unique
optimal equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) has been identified as one of the
most disruptive technologies of this century. It has attracted
much attention of society, industry and academia as a promis-
ing technology that can enhance day to day activities, the
creation of new business models, products and services, and
as a broad source of research topics and ideas. However, due
to the low cost and low complexity constraints, IoT is also one
of the most vulnerable elements in the network to be attached,
and thus, facing serious data security issues. In recent years,
security and traceability of collected data from IoT devices has
attracted great attention from society, especially the health data
in the field of e-Health. Initially proposing a solution to this
problem in cryptographic domains, blockchain has gradually
become the focus in both the financial sector and the society
[1]. Besides being an effective means to protect the security
and privacy of virtual assets, it also emerges as a promising
tool in designing an autonomous and scalable decentralized
network which can attract more participants to share their edge
resources. To foster distributed edge-centric models for edge-
centric IoT by encouraging edge resources sharing, [2] has
elucidated the consensus facets from myriad of aspects, such
as data structure, scalable consensus ledgers, and so on.
However, constrained by the cost, size and battery life,
typical IoT devices can not possess sufficient capability to
run a resolute demanding blockchain protocol. MEC, as an
emerging technology, allows wireless devices to offload their
their computation tasks to edge servers. It has been studied
that the computational resource allocation problem of public
blockchain network can be solved under MEC environment,
where wireless devices rent computational resources from
corresponding edge servers to solve the Proof-of-work (PoW)
puzzle, and earn mining rewards as well as transaction fees
from blockchain [3]. As mobile miners, wireless devices can
resort to the nearby edge server to perform the PoW puzzle and
content caching in [4], where computation offloading schedul-
ing and caching strategy are jointly considered. Although the
topic of blockchain based offloading strategy has been studied
extensively, there still exist some overlooked problems.
Most of researches treat wireless devices as miners whose
main purposes are to maximize the mining rewards. However,
what motivates wireless devices to upload transactions to
blockchain is actually the characteristics of a trusted leger,
where data can not be tempered and destroyed. In contrast
to the faster transaction uploading needs of wireless devices,
the throughput of current blockchain project is so small. For
example, Bitcoin’s throughout is only about 7 transactions
per second. How to do the mining process is not the focus
of wireless devices, but the concern of edge servers who
aim to earn transaction fees. To this end, in this paper,
wireless devices are blockchain users who only need to upload
transactions to blockchain with requirements for transaction
rate, while both normal edge servers and servers with wireless
access function are actual blockchain miners who undertake
blockchain functionality operations. Besides, it is reasonable
to assume that all IoT devices are connected with the servers
through wireless channel. It is worth to note that the wireless
link between the device and server is secure since every
transaction contains the signature [5]. To avoid transactions
uploading termination caused by single point failure of the
accessed server, wireless devices can broadcast their transac-
tions to all nearby access points they can access.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1)
Considering the actual needs of wireless devices which are
constrained by cost, size and battery life, different from other
researches, they are treated as blockchain users in this paper,
who only need to upload transactions into blockchain, while
the blockchain functionality operations are executed in the
edge servers. 2) The Stackelberg game is constructed to model
the interaction between blockchain users and blockchain min-
ers. According to the data spread on blockchain network,
acting as the leader, all blockchain miners can reach a con-
sensus on the price per block. Then, as followers, blockchain
users require their transaction rate based on the price. 3) A
distributed algorithm is proposed, which can effective solve
the game model.
The system model and problem formulation are given in
Section II. In Section III, the optimal solution of the Stack-
elberg game formulated in previous section is analysed and
the distributed algorithm is proposed. Simulation results are
discussed in Section IV. In Section V, the conclusion and
future work are given.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
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Fig. 1. A typical scenario of blockchain based MEC for e-Health
A. System model
As illustrated in Fig.1, the system model adopted in this pa-
per consists of two entities: 1) blockchain users, 2) blockchain
miners. Wireless devices who need to upload transactions to
blockchain are blockchain users. Both normal edge servers
and edge servers with wireless access function in this system
are blockchain miners. With PoW consensus mechanism, each
blockchain miner needs to perform hashing operations at a
huge rate, resulting in a low block completion probability for
its Bernoulli trails, meaning that the block completions at each
blockchain miner can be modeled as a Poisson process [6].
Let {λ1, ..., λi}, i ∈ K denote the block completion rate of
blockchain miners’ set (denoted by K = {1, ...,K}) measured
by the number of blocks per hour. Therefore, the aggregate
block completion of blockchain can also be modeled as a
Poisson process with rate.
Λ =
K∑
i=1
λi. (1)
The main chain is chosen by the Longest-Chain-Rule (LCR)
[1] in the model. Due to the fact that a mined block is not
immediately synchronized to the entire system because of
transmission delay, it will routinely happen that simultaneous
blocks may spread in the system and each miner individually
chooses which block to accept. Thus, the effective growth
rate of the main chain (denoted by Γ) will be less than the
aggregate block completion rate Λ. Assuming that each block
contains T transactions, the effective transaction rate of whole
blockchain can be modeled as a Poisson process with rate TΓ.
To inspire normal operation of this system, it is reasonable for
blockchain miners to charge blockchain users a fee with price
β per block. Of course, there is no need for blockchain users
to pay for orphan blocks. Paying a fee, it is also reasonable
for blockchain users to require an appropriate transaction rate
γj , j ∈ N (N = {1, ..., N} denote blockchain users’ set).
Thus, there exists an equation between the overall effective
transaction rate TΓ and transaction rate γj ,
TΓ =
N∑
j=1
γj . (2)
Focusing on symmetric scenarios, the block completion
rate of different blockchain miners can be set to the same
value with λi ≡ λ, for all i ∈ K. Therefore, the aggre-
gate block completion rate Λ = Kλ. According to [7],
the communication intervals between two blockchain miners
k 6= l, {k, l} ∈ K can be assumed as an exponential distribu-
tion with parameters µk,l. Without loss of generality, for all
k 6= l, {k, l} ∈ K, the communication intervals can be also set
to the same value with µk,l ≡ µ. Based on the conclusion of
[6], the effective growth rate Γ behaves as
Γ = Kλ
(
1− λA
µ
)
= Λ
(
1− ΛA
Kµ
)
(3)
where A =
∑K−1
k=1
1
k for the sake of presentation. Based on
equation (2), Λ can then show as follows,
Λ =
Kµ(T − σ)
2AT
(4)
where
0 < σ =
√√√√T(KTµ− 4A∑Nj=1 γj)
Kµ
< T. (5)
Actually, there is another feasible solution Λ
′
= Kµ(T+σ)2AT >
Kµ
2A . However, when Λ =
Kµ
2A , Γ gets its extreme value. As a
result, when Λ = Λ
′
, there would be more computational re-
sources consumption. Thus, for a better state, Λ
′
is discarded.
Once a blockchain user generates a transaction, this trans-
action will be then broadcast to the nearby blockchain miners
which are equipped with wireless access function. In order
to include transactions in a block and spread this block on
blockchain, blockchain miners would compete with each other
to solve a PoW puzzle with the given parameters derived by
the data of blockchain, at the cost of their own computing
power. Let c denote the cost of a blockchain miner to produce
a unit of computational power, and then the cost for each block
is cr where r is the miner’s computing power or hash power
[8]. Learning from [9], there exists an relationship λ = r/D
where D is the difficulty of mining a block. Thus, the cost of
generating a block in this model is
cr = cD
r
D
= cDλ = cD
Λ
K
. (6)
Considering a practical constraint that D must be an appro-
priate value which can avoid generating block too fast [1]
and each blockchain miner has finite computation capacity.
Therefore, there exists a constraint λ ≤ λmax. As a result,
there exists
Λ = Kλ ≤ Kλmax. (7)
Then, in this symmetric scenario, based on the equation
(3), there exists an fixed upper bound Γmax for Γ with
corresponding value K,
Γmax =
{
Kλmax
(
1− λmaxAµ
)
λmax <
µ
2A ,
Kµ
4A λmax ≥ µ2A .
(8)
Hence, according to equation (2), the constraint on blockchain
users’ requirements for their transaction rates can show as
follows,
N∑
j=1
γj = TΓ ≤ TΓmax. (9)
B. Stackelberg Game Formulation
In order to encourage blockchain miners to share their
computational resources, they have rights to claim for a fee
for every transaction which is paid by blockchain users.
With different fees, blockchain users could require different
transaction rates. As to blockchain user j, defined as fj ,
when it has a requirement γj for transaction rate, according to
equation (3), the fee, that it should pay to each transaction, is
β/T , where β is the price of single block. Thus the Stackelberg
game can be formulated to model the interaction between the
blockchain users and blockchain miners, where the blockchain
miners’ set is the leader and blockchain users are the followers.
At blockchain users’ side, the utility of blockchain user fj
includes the satisfaction degree and incentive cost, i.e., the
transaction fee. The objective of them is to maximize the
utility by requiring considerable transaction rate γj , for given
price β per block set by blockchain miners’ set. Therefore,
the optimization problem for fj can be expressed as follows
max
γj
Ufj = α log (1 + γj)−
β
T
γj
s.t.
N∑
j=1
γj ≤ TΓmax
(10)
where α is the weight factor. Widely used in mobile com-
puting and wireless communication domains [10] [11], the
logarithmic function f = log(1 + y) is adopted to evaluate
the satisfaction degree of blockchain users in this paper.
At blockchain miners’ side, the utility function of them
is defined as charged transaction fees minus computational
resources consumption per hour. The goal of them is to
maximize their revenue by helping blockchain users upload
transactions to blockchain with price β per effective block.
Mathematically, the optimization problem can be expressed as
max
β
Ul = βΓ− cD Λ
K
· Λ. (11)
III. OPTIMAL SOLUTION ANALYSIS
In this section, based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions [12] and backward induction method, the optimiza-
tion problem of both leaders and followers are firstly analysed.
Then, in the distributed environment, under the help of iterative
update function proposed in this paper, the optimal solution
can be obtained. Finally, the optimal solution is proved to be
a SE in the proposed game.
A. Analysis of Follower’s Optimization Problem
For blockchain user fj , the second order derivation of Ufj
with respect to γj can be expressed as follows,
∂2Ufj
(∂γj)
2 = −
α
(γj + 1)
2 < 0. (12)
That means Ufj is a concave function of γj . Since the
constraint (9) is affine, the Lagrangian with the multiplier
u can be applied to solve this optimization problem (10) at
blockchain user fj as follows
Lfj (γj , u) =α log (1 + γj)−
β
T
γj
−u
γj +∑
i 6=j
γi − TΓmax
 , (13)
and the KKT conditions can be gotten as follows where ∗
represent the optimal solution.
u∗
γ∗j +∑
i6=j
γi − TΓmax
 = 0,
γ∗j +
∑
i 6=j
γi − TΓmax ≤ 0,
γ∗j > 0, u
∗ ≥ 0.
(14)
Let
∂Lfj (γj ,u)
∂γj
= 0, the optimal γ∗j can be obtained
γ∗j =
Tα
β + Tu∗
− 1. (15)
It is easy to see that γ∗j is a function of β, which means that
to obtain γ∗j , the corresponding β is a necessary information.
Besides, the information about the maximum transaction rate
TΓmax this system can afford and the current transaction
∂2Ul
(∂β)
2 = −
2αTu
(β + Tu)
3 −
2cD
K
{
1
σ2
T 2α2
(β + Tu)
4 +Λ
[
2AT
Kµσ3
T 2α2
(β + Tu)
4 +
1
σ
2T α
(β + Tu)
3
]}
< 0. (16)
flow
∑
i6=j γi is also necessary. Based on the above, these
information exchange will be considered in the designed
blockchain of future work.
B. Analysis of Leader’s Optimization Problem
For blockchain miners, based on the backward induction
method, the second order derivation of Ul with respect to β
can be expressed as follows
∂2Ul
(∂β)
2 =2
∂Γ
∂γj
∂γj
∂β
+β
[
∂2Γ
(∂γj)
2
(
∂γj
∂β
)2
+
∂Γ
∂γj
∂2γj
(∂β)
2
]
−2cD
K
{(
∂Λ
∂γj
∂γj
∂β
)2
+Λ
[
∂2Λ
(∂γj)
2
(
∂γj
∂β
)2
+
∂Λ
∂γj
∂2γj
(∂β)
2
]}
.
(17)
To prove that Ul has an extreme value, its convexity should
be first analysed. From equation (15), with the corresponding
β, γ∗j can be calculated. Then, its first order derivation and
second order derivation to β can be gotten{ ∂γj
∂β = − Tα(β+Tu)2 ,
∂2γj
(∂β)2
= 2Tα
(β+Tu)3
.
(18)
According to equation (2) and (4), the first and second
derivation of Γ and Λ show as follows,{
∂Γ
∂γj
= 1T ,
∂2Γ
(∂γj)
2 = 0.
(19)
{
∂Λ
∂γj
= 1σ ,
∂2Λ
(∂γj)
2 =
2AT
Kµσ3 .
(20)
where σ =
√
T(KTµ−4A∑Nj=1 γj)
Kµ . As a result, the conclusion
exists that ∂
2Ul
(∂β)2
< 0 in equation (16), which indicates that Ul
is a concave function of β.
Therefore, the optimal price β∗ set by blockchain miners
can be gotten when Ul(β∗) is the extreme value. Although, in
distributed environment, it is hard to get the closed form of
β∗ from the equation (21), because blockchain miners do not
know the utility function of blockchain users. However, with
the classic iterative method [10], the optimal solution can be
worked out, and this progress will be represented in below.
∂Ul
∂β
= Γ + β
∂Γ
∂γj
∂γj
∂β
− 2cD
K
Λ
∂Λ
∂γj
∂γj
∂β
= 0. (21)
C. Optimal Solution
Combined with the above analysis, an updating scheme
in distributed environment could be designed to achieve the
optimal solution. In the proposed Stackelberg game, based on
the computing cost c, β firstly is assigned an appropriate value
Algorithm 1 Iterative Updating Function
Input: α, c, D, µ, λmax, K, N, T
Output: the converged β and γj , j ∈ N (N = {1, ..., N}
1: Get Γmax using (8)
2: Let the price βt = c+ ∆ where ∆ is an extremely small
positive number
3: for each blockchain user fj , j ∈ N (N = {1, ..., N} do
4: Set iteration number index t = 0
5: converged← false
6: while not converged do
7: For blockchain user fj :
8: Set the Lagrangian multiplier ut = 0
9: Get βt and
∑
i 6=j γi according to blockchain state,
update the corresponding transaction rate γtj using
(15)
10: if γtj > TΓmax −
∑
i 6=j γi then
11: Get the right ut according to (22)
12: γtj = TΓmax −
∑
i6=j γi
13: end if
14: t = t+ 1
15: For blockchain miners:
16: if
∂Ul
∣∣∣∣γj=γtj
∂β < 0 then
17: converged← true
18: β∗ = βt and γ∗j = γ
t
j
19: end if
20: Get γtj and u
t from blockchain user fj , update
the block price βt+1 according to (23).
21: end while
22: end for
23: return β∗ and γ∗j , j ∈ N (N = {1, ..., N}
which satisfies ∂Ul(β)∂β > 0. Then according to equation (15),
after receiving the price βt (t denote the iteration index) set
by blockchain miners, the corresponding γtj can be obtained
at blockchain user fj . Before sending it as game information
to blockchain miners for price updating, it is necessary to
check whether ut = 0 and γj = γtj meet the KKT conditions.
When γtj > TΓmax −
∑
i6=j γi which tells that the constraint
γj +
∑
i 6=j γi ≤ TΓmax is active. Then, in this condition,
γtj = TΓmax −
∑
i 6=j γi, and according to equation (22), u
t
can be gotten,
ut =
α
T Γmax + 1−
∑
i 6=j γi
− β
t
T
. (22)
Next, from information γtj and
∂γj
∂β
∣∣
(βt,ut) sended by the
blockchain user fj , based on equation (18)-(21), blockchain
miners can update their price by using the following updating
function (23) as follows,
βt+1 =
µcD (T − σt)
Aσt
+
γj
t +
∑
i6=j γi
Tα
(
βt + Tut
)2
, (23)
where σt =
√
(KTµ−4Aγtj−4A
∑
i6=j γi)T
Kµ .
After that, it would be sent to blockchain users for the next
round updating. Repeating the process until both the β and
γj converge to a unique fixed value finally, the utility of both
the users and miners cannot increase any more. Finally, the
optimal solution is achieved. To better elucidate the above,
the detail of the process is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
D. Stackelberg Equilibrium Solution
To prove the optimal solution analysed above is also the SE
solution in which any participants has no motivation to deviate,
the SE in this model can be firstly stated in Definition 1.
Definition 1. When β is fixed, if γ∗j satisfies Lfj
(
γ∗j , u
∗) ≥
Lfj (γ, u), and when γj if fixed, if β
∗ satisfied Ul (β∗) ≥
Ul (β), the Strategy Profile (β∗, γ∗j ) is a SE in the proposed
game.
Then the conclusion that (β∗, γ∗j ) is equal to the SE solution
(βSE , γSEj ) can be drawn according to Appendix A.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performance is numerically evaluated
in two aspects. First, the iterative updating process is showed
under different numbers of blockchain miners. Second, the
tendency of the strategy profile and utility are presented with
an increasing number of blockchain miners.
A. Simulation Settings
Corresponding to the average communication delay 12.6s
in Bitcoin which is stated in [13], the communication interval
parameter is set µ = 285/h. Bitcoin’s block completion rate
is 6/h which can also be learned in [13], and its throughput is
about 7 transactions per second [14]. Thus, every ten minutes,
one block is generated and about 4000 transactions are written
into blockchain. Hence, the number of transactions in each
block T can be set to 4000. Let weight factor α = 1 and
cD = 1 which can also be set to other appropriate positive
value. The max block completion rate of single device is fixed
λmax = 0.1, showing that each blockchain miner can generate
a maximum of one block every ten hours.
B. Simulation Analysis
Fig.2 shows the iterative process of the pricing per block
set by blockchain miners and the blockchain users’ changing
requirements of transaction rate under different number of
blockchain miners. From Fig.2 (a), it is easy to see that as the
number of iteration goes up, the price increases and finally
converges to a stable value. Moreover, for more blockchain
miners, the converged value of β will become smaller. Because
of the increasing ability to generate blocks, although the price
is smaller, the total revenue of blockchain miners can still
be guaranteed. Similarly, in Fig.2 (b), the transaction rate
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Fig. 2. Price per block vs. block completion rate per device
requirement γj of blockchain user fj will reach a stable
value at last. It is also not difficult to understand why it
moves inversely. Due to the reduction of price with increased
blockchain miners, fj can have faster requirement of transac-
tion rate.
The evolution of utilities of both blockchain users and min-
ers, the price set by the blockchain miners and the transaction
rate needed by blockchain users are shown in Fig.3. First,
it can be clearly seen in Figs.3 (a) and (b) that the price β
increases and transaction rate γj decreases with the increasing
number of blockchain miners, which is also consistent with
the analysis from Fig.2. Second, based on Figs.3 (c) and (d),
as the number of blockchain miners increases, the utilities
of blockchain users and miners raise as well, though the
transaction rate of fj increases correspondingly. This is also
the purpose of this algorithm, while meeting the requirements
of blockchain users, it will guarantee the benefits of both
parties. Finally, it shows a slowing trend as the number of
blockchain miners increases. Because when the number reach
a fixed value, the overall effective growth rate of blockchain
will not increase, with more orphan blocks.
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Fig. 3. Utility and metrics versus the number of blockchain miners
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a Stackelberg game is proposed to coordinate
the needs of both the blockchain users and the blockchain min-
ers where as blockchain users, paying fees, E-Health monitors
can upload health data to blockchain with the aid of blockchain
miners. Through the game between them, the revenue of the
overall blockchain miners can be guaranteed, and at the same
time, the performance of the transaction rate required by
the blockchain users is also ensured. Besides validating the
correctness of this model, the numerical results also shows
that it behaves better when there are more blockchain miners,
though it will not grow obviously after the number of them
has reached a certain value.
For future work, simulation of single blockchain user will
be extended to multiple blockchain users. Moreover, based on
the distributed algorithm designed in this paper, the detailed
interaction process between blockchain users and blockchain
miners will be further discussed. Considering the existences of
malicious blockchain users or blockchain miners, the security
performance will be further analysed in future work.
APPENDIX A
Based on the following properties, the optimal solution can
be proved to be equal to the SE solution.
Property 1. For blockchain user fj , when β is fixed, γ∗j is
the global optimum which can maximize Lfj (γj , u).
According to equation (24), where ∂
2Uf
(∂λ)2
< 0 as analysed
in equation (12) and g(γj) = −u(
∑N
j=1 γj − TΓmax),
Lfj (γj , u) is a concave function of γj . Satisfying the condition
of definition 1, Lfj (γj , u) can get its maximum when γj = γ
∗
j .
Thus, it is also the SE solution γSEj
∂2Lfj (γj , u)
(∂γj)
2 =
∂2Ufj
(∂γj)
2 +
∂2g (γj)
(∂γj)
2 < 0. (24)
Property 2. For blockchain miners, the required transaction
rate γj of fj decreases as the price β increases according
to equation (18). This makes sense because when blockchain
miners increase their price, blockchain users will have lower
requirements for the transaction rate.
Property 3. For blockchain miners, when blockchain users
get the desired transaction rate γj , β∗ is the optimal price
which can maximize Ul(β) under the condition that ∂
2Ul
(∂β)2
< 0
according to equation (16).
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